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1. Introduction. 
The current continental philosophies, apart from 
Marxian tinges, seem to range across three trends: the 
transcendental, the hermeneutical and the semiotic. 
Despite the "decline11 of the Husserlian "idealism," the 
transcendental understanding continues to appear in 
various terminological guises, ranging from socio-
histörical through linguistic topics. For example, 
Karl Otto Apel's discussion of sciences and hermeneu-
tics argues for the communicative community as a tran-
scendental condition for all social and scientific un-
derstanding; in language, Erik Heintel claims that lan-
guage is incomprehensible without a transcendental 
difference between sign and signification, between lin-
guistic terms standing for something and their manifes-
tation of more in meaning than is required to point to 
an object. 
The task of this essay is to trace out the funda-
mental notions in the three trends suggested above and 
to note whether the controversies among them presume 
some common basis despite linguistic variations. The 
essay will be limited to some of the major figures in 
continental philosophy. The discussion will focus on 
the three topics with respect to their problematics and 
their fundamental pre-judgments, even if such pre-
judgments have not been noticed by the current conti-
nental thinkers. In addition, the discussion will of-
fer a brief historical outline suggesting the origin of 
some of the views, such as the hermeneutical and the 
semiotic. While not exhaustive, the discussion pur-
ports to be fundamental in the sense of conditions 
required of a particular mode of philosophizing. 
2. The Transcendental. 
While the battle cry of the transcendental turn in 
Husserl was "to the things themselves," the turn 
focuses more on the experience of the things them-
selves. The primary concern, thus, is to decipher the 
experiential structures and processes within whose con-
text the things themselves are given. The experiential 
9 
performances are radically distinct from the objects to 
which such performances are correlated. The final 
ground of the performances is to be sought in the func-
tioning, the activities of the presumed transcendental 
Ego. The transcendental turn was compelled by the pro-
blem of deciphering the activities of the Ego without 
making the Ego into an object, into something which 
requires the assumption of activities of awareness that 
would present the Ego as something experienced. 
The task of the transcendental turn, as Husserl saw 
it, was to delimit the absolute apriori correlation 
between the noetic and the noematic, the meaning act of 
intentionality and the meant objective structure.1 Yet 
it soon became obvious that the reflective description 
of an act of meaning something objective became 
problematic. The act itself became something objective 
correlated to an act of reflection and hence found as a 
component in the field of awareness. As Klaus Held has 
suggested, the reflective act makes the act reflected 
upon something objective, objectified, while the re-
flecting act must function anonymously.1 Hence the 
question must be answered concerning the functioning of 
the Ego in reflection in relationship to its own acts. 
Any attempt to decipher the anonymously functioning Ego 
and its acts reveals the following morphology: the 
living present consists of two factors, the standing 
and the streaming. Any effort to capture the ego in 
its act reveals it as streaming, as sinking away toward 
retention, while the retending activity must function 
anonymously. Hence, there appears a constant dif-
ference between the anonymously functioning activity of 
the Ego and the Ego's act which is sinking away into 
retentional awareness.' 
The problem of capturing the transcendental Ego as 
something permanent manifests an ambiguity. A reflec-
tion on the identity of the ego shows it to be flowing; 
a reflection on the Ego's act as flowing, shows it as 
permanence, as some identical component in the flux of 
retensions. Any effort to posit the identity of the 
Ego, compels reflection to assume another Ego, a more 
primordial Ego for which the reflected upon Ego becomes 
an object which is flowing away, distancing. What is 
actually encountered in direct awareness is a process 
of distancing, a process of differentiation between the 
reflecting Ego and the Ego which is being reflected. 
Paradoxically, the permanence, the identity of the Ego 
is grasped constantly in flux, in decomposition, in 
differentiation from itself. It seems then that it is 
impossible to demonstrate at this level an identity 
without a decomposition of it, without its self-differ-
entiation. Any presence of an identity is encountered 
not as a unity but as a multiplicity, a differentiation 
in flux. This mutual attempt and inabiliry to capture 
the identity of the Ego seems to be the catalyst which 
led the analysis back toward something anonymous, some 
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process which Husserl had to call "Ur-Ego" which is no 
longer Ego, but Ego only by equivocation.* 
One way to grasp this process is to show its struc-
turation of time. If we were to assume that the Ego is 
always located "now," then we would note that the "now" 
makes no sense without the "just having been" and the 
"just about to come." This suggests that the "now" 
cannot be understood without its differentiation into 
the other two temporal phases. What is significant for 
the subsequent discussion is the fact that this dif-
ferentiation, this breaking up of the "now" or the 
"present" does not constitute itself as signification, 
as a way of one differentiated aspect to signify, to 
point to another. Using common terms such as past-
present- future, we note that the terms cannot signify 
one another, point to or be representative of one 
another. The meaning of the "now" or "present" does 
not point to the meaning of "past" or "future." And 
yet it does not mean anything without the other terms. 
Its meaning emerges only in its being different from 
the others. The others, in turn have no meaning apart 
from their being different from the term "now" or from 
each other. Their meaning emerges in their differenti-
ation from each other. Yet the "event" of differentia-
tion which "subtends" and abolishes any direct signifi-
cation of one term by another, institutes a condition 
which is prior even to the fundamental experience of 
permanence and flux. Any attempt to depict one or the 
other requires their differentiation and the recogni-
tion that neither has a meaning in itself and that 
neither points to the other; rather, both point to the 
"event" of their differentiation and to their meanings 
as constituted on the basis of their difference from 
each other. 
Being a condition for the experience of the most 
fundamental transcendental awareness—the constitution 
of temporal phases—the "event" of differentiation can-
not be located either as present, past or future; after 
all, it is a condition for the meaning of either of the 
terms. Some other examples might be offered for the 
understanding of this unique "event." If we were to 
say that at present we hear a "high" tone, we note that 
the "high" tone is not experienceable as "high" without 
the passive presence of a "low" tone. What is remarka-
ble is that the "high" tone does not appear as "high" 
on the basis of association with the low tone; associa-
tion requires similarity, yet what we find here is dis-
similarity, difference. The "high" tone is heard only 
because it is passively differentiated from the "low" 
tone. This means that the experience of a "high" tone 
does not point to the experience of a "low" tone, but 
to its difference from the "low" tone. Prior to asso-
ciation, there is a differentiation. Obviously, the 
same is valid for linguistic terms. 
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Beginning with the attempt to capture the transcen-
dental Ego in its presence and identity, we are led to 
realize that such an identity is capturable only on the 
basis of self-differentiation, and the self-differen-
tiation is an "event" which cannot be termed either as 
permanence or flux, cannot be located either in the 
stream of consciousness or as a permanent point of ref-
erence from which all conscious acts radiate. As 
Ludwig Landgrebe had suggested, even the term "con-
sciousness" would be misleading.* In deed, if the term 
"consciousness" means a set of identifiable operations 
and structures, then the "event" which establishes such 
operations, structures and their differentiations, is 
to be regarded as inaccessible either to language or to 
reflection. 
2. The Hermeneutical. 
The hermeneutical understanding is designed to 
demonstrate that any metaphysics of essence, concerned 
with the cosmos of the sum of things or objects defina-
ble and identifiable essentially, forgets the dif-
ference between beings and Being.' Forgetfulness of 
the question of Being is fundamentally the forgetful-
ness of the difference between beings and Being. The 
effort to find the ground of metaphysics is not 
directed toward the return to the metaphysics of the 
essence of all beings, but to the discovery of what 
makes metaphysics possible. This possibility is the 
suggested difference. Whether we stress the early, the 
anthropological analyses of Heidegger, or the later, 
the Being quest, both aim at the discovery of a dimen-
sion which made metaphysics possible and which calls 
for the abolition of the metaphysics of essence. The 
discovery of the difference between beings and Being is 
tantamount to the rejection of the cliams of metaphysi-
cal foundational!sm. In this sense the philosophical 
hermeneutics is compelled to reject the traditional me-
thodological hermeneutics and the latter's contention 
that it can provide an objective analysis of historical 
events. Any objective analysis presupposes the meta-
physics of essence and hence fails to grasp the condi-
tion of its own possibility as metaphysics. 
Regardless of the ways that Being is interpreted, 
whether as a temporal horizon of the possibility of all 
possibilities,7 or as something that is manifested in 
anxiety,* or as the "more" of the historical horizon 
with which our horizons fuse,' one common "function" 
rules such interpretations: the difference between 
beings, whether they are objects, ideas, subjective 
processes or cultural products, and Being. In this 
sense the difference which grounds both, the beings and 
Being in their mutual relationship and distinction, 
cannot be either one of the beings or Being. According 
to Karl Heinz Volkmann-Schluck, the "apart from beings 
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and Being, there is the difference. It is something 
other than beings and Being; indeed the difference is 
primordial, for it comprises the ground for the appear-
ance of beings in their Being."1' 
The difference, the differentiation, is precisely 
what is problematic. It is not one of the beings, 
because it is the "event" which allows beings to appear 
in light of Being; and it is not being, because it is 
the "place" which manifests Being in its otherness from 
beings. Whether it is interpreted as "Da-Sein" as 
"being-there" where Being appears, or as "Ex-istence" 
as an "oppenness toward Being" as a "going out toward 
the horizon of the possible," the difference cannot be 
objectified and made into a theme of direct investiga-
tion which would offer its "essence." It remains 
removed from, although implicit, in any 
investigation.11 Philosophical hermeneutics is an at-
tempt to trace this difference without objectifying it 
as "pre-understanding," as "always and already there," 
and as an event which we ourselves are. 
The "event" which constitutes the differentiation 
between beings and Being is not one of signifying, of 
pointing to something. It is not a consciousness which 
would intend or mean something in a univocal sense. It 
does not point to beings in their essence or to Being 
an a temporal horizon of all possibilities; rather it 
is an unavoidable and anonymous "event" which estab-
lishes the meaning of beings and Being in their 
difference. More fundamentally, the "event" of the 
difference is not only a condition of manifesting the 
"presence" of Being in its difference from beings as 
something positive, as something which reveals beings 
in their movement "toward" Being, but as something 
negative. The difference reveals beings fundamentally 
not for what they are but for what they are not. It is 
a condition for transcendence of totality toward what 
beings are not. This is to say it manifests not only 
what things are in light of their Being, but above all 
what they are not in light of their possibility of 
Being: things are different from what they are not. 
We are touching upon an "event" which comprises the 
condition of negativity, whether in the Heideggerian 
sense of "being-toward-death," the existential sense of 
"nothingness" or the current Marxian sense of "Negative 
Dialectics." 
Gerd Brand suggests that the Husserlian Ur-Ego, in 
its process of self-differentiation and temporaliza-
tion, comprising the anonymous condition for awareness, 
is the basis of the hermeneutical conception of the 
"difference."11 And in his discussion of Husserlian 
structure of intentionality and time, Ludwig Landgrebe 
argues that the Heideggerian conception of Dasein re-
flects precisely the Husserlian transcendental consti-
tution of the time consciousness: the differentiation 
between temporal phases.11 This is not an attempt to 
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detract from the hermeneutical contributions, but to 
indicate that the principle of the "difference" and 
differentiation is one of the main philosophical 
themes. 
If we grant that Brand and Landgrebe are correct in 
their discussion of the transcendental and the her-
meneutical principles, then the disagreement between 
the two trends must be located as a less fundamental 
level. The disagreement is fundamentally about priori-
ties. For Husserl, the Ur-Ego, as the anonymous event 
which constitutes permanence, flux and their differen-
tiation is pre-liuguistic. Various languages, and 
various linguistic expressions presuppose this funda-
mental awareness, hence each language, or a particular 
linguistic formation within a language, comprise only 
an example of such an awareness. As Erich Heintel sug-
gests, the Husserlian conception of language requires 
language to be an expression of experience.x* In this 
sense, language comprises an arbitrary set of 
"external" signs for the expression of the experiential 
process. 
Hermeneutics contests this view of language and 
experience. It argues that if there is a transcenden-
tal ly functioning awareness, the only thing we can know 
about it are its linguistic expressions. Yet once such 
expressions are employed, the transcendental functions 
are interpreted within a linguistic tradition within 
whose context we acquire our understanding. Hence, the 
argument goes on, the traditionally transmitted lan-
guage does not give us "the" fundamental awareness, but 
an awareness in the context of our linguistic interpre-
tations. A linguistic tradition cannot be encompassed 
by any awareness; it is more than any user of a lan-
guage can master. As a matter of fact, the linguistic 
tradition provides awareness with the possibility of 
reflection precisely because the linguistic tradition 
is the historically effective consciousness which is 
more than we are and into whose horizons our awareness 
fuses. The "more" is what allows for reflection of 
language in language. As Gadamer would have it, it is 
not what we say or do, but what happens to us apart 
from our saying and doing that is at issue.1* In this 
sense, the linguistic tradition cannot be objectified 
by any conscious reflection on language. 
Fundamentally, the hermeneutical argument is 
designed to show that a linguistic tradition, compris-
ing our understanding and interpretation of all events, 
including ourselves, is the condition of all differen-
tiations. One could say that the tradition is a 
"medium" which mediates all experience; thus it cannot 
be mediated by anything else. As the "unmediated 
medium," it is the historically effective conscious-
ness.1' This is the point which reveals that hermeneu-
tics assumes something which is "outside" the hermeneu-
tical parameters. While discussing the historically 
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effective consciousness as a linguistic tradition, 
there is assumed a reflection on this consciousness 
which must distance itself from such a consciousness. 
Such a reflection objectifies and mediates the under-
standing of a tradition, and is a condition which al-
lows hermeneutics to regard the tradition as "histor-
ical ." 
There are various arguments which point to this 
condition. (i) When hermeneutical understanding con-
fronts scientific and techinical languages and con-
trasts them with the broader and more fundamental lin-
guisticality of a tradition, it assumes a position of 
differentiation and comparison which belongs neither to 
the hermeneutical understanding nor to the scientific-
technical languages. (ii) The hermeneutical under-
standing as a linguistic tradition in which we live 
have no signs revealing that they are "historical." 
They become historical only when they are mediated by a 
reflection which designates them as historical. (iii) 
The direct "living in a language of a tradition" does 
not reveal language but .the world; language functions 
anonymously. It effaces itself before the world. 
Hence to speak of language as a medium for the 
manifestation of nature and of history, is to assume an 
implicit distinction between language and what it 
points to and hence to take a stance "outside" of lan-
guage and of what it signifies. (iv) To claim that the 
historically effective consciousness comprises a 
horizon which is more extensive than our conscious 
horizons is to differentiate between them and to show 
how they fuse. Both horizons must be objectified from 
the vantage point of their difference. This is the 
condition without which no discussion of their fusion 
would make sense." This reflective distance and the 
differentiation of hermeneutics from other modes of 
thought is the mediating condition which belongs 
neither to hermeneutics nor to science. According to 
Heintel, this condition can be called the "transcenden-
tal difference."" We are thrown back to the pre-
linguistic "event" as an awareness of and differenti-
ation among various linguistic conceptions. While 
mediated through linguistic expressions, the awareness 
which confronts such expressions is the ultimate 
"unmediated mediation." According to Heintel, without 
the vantage point of the transcendental difference we 
would not be cognizant of our linguisticality; we would 
live in language like an animal lives in its 
environment.*• 
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3. The Semiotic. 
The "difference," says Jacques Derrida, is older 
than Being.20 The source of this announcement, while 
stemming from Derrida*s investigations of such philo-
sophical trends as Hegelian dialectics, Nietzschean 
life philosophy, Freudian conception of the libido, 
also has its source in the linguistic tradition begin-
ning with Ferdinand DeSaussure extending through the 
"field-linguistis" such as Jost Trier, Weisgerber and 
Greimas, leading to Merleau-Ponty's "dia-critical" 
conception of perception and language.21 In their 
historical researches, the "field" theorists have shown 
that there are no univocal terms for objects which 
somehow would point to the "same" objects. They insist 
that we can no longer maintain a biblical innocence 
pretending that a God gave us precise terms and pointed 
to the objects which the terms should signify. Terms 
have meaning only within the internal articulation of a 
particular language. The internal articulation is not 
premissed on terms pointing to something and thus ac-
quiring meaning in this signification, but on the mutu-
al relationships and differentiations among terms. The 
meaning of a term is based on the term's place in the 
field of other terms. 
To maintain this thesis is to abolish any notion of 
"representation," of "standing in" for something or of 
a sign as making something "present." There is no sim-
ilarity between linguistic terms and the supposed ob-
jects which sucn terms are designed to signify; in this 
sense the terms cannot "represent," be an "image of" or 
a "symbol for" anything, cannot make anything "present" 
as it is "in itself." The assumption that terms are 
signs and thus signify either objects or concepts 
states that the meaning of the terms consists in this 
relationship of pointing to something, or of being a 
manifestation of something which is present. For 
Nerleau-Ponty, for example, language is a system 
requiring a combination and interaction of signs. He 
describes the relationship among signs as "diacriti-
cal," i.e., a process of differentiation among signs. 
Following DeSaussure, Merleau-Ponty argues that lan-
guage is not a sum of signs but a way of differentiat-
ing signs from one another. A more drastic expression 
of this view would be that in language there are only 
differences without positive terms. 2 2 
In order for meaning to be born, there must be an 
interaction of signs, and meaning emerges only at the 
intersection, only in the interval between words, only 
in their difference. The diacritical conception lends 
language a power to precede itself, to constantly call 
for more than what is being said, to demand other terms 
as diacritical counterparts of the currently used 
terms. In this sense, we do not learn language by 
learning to use terms in one-to-one correlation with 
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objects or thoughts, but by being led to capture the 
meaning in a continuous process of differentiations 
among terms. What is essential is that terms neither 
signify, mean or represent directly nor do they point 
to associative similarities with other terms. Rather 
they mark a difference from other terms in a linguistic 
field, and this difference is what constitutes meaning. 
This implies that it is impossible for any term to 
reveal something as "present" as "identical," as having 
a univocal meaning without at the same time depicting 
that something not as it is "in itself" but only as it 
is difforent from something else. The meaning is con-
stantly defered, shifted toward the difference required 
of any signification. 
The presence, the positivity, identity, sameness, 
giveness cannot be maintained. Signs are not only 
"totally other" than what they pretend to signify, to 
present, but also lack any positivity in themselves. 
On the one hand, signs cannot emerge from our relation-
ship to the world of objects and concepts which would 
be "present" in the signs, and, on the other, they do 
not point to other terms, associate with other terms in 
a positive way. Rather the signs "deconstruct" one 
another.1* Terms cannot point to one another, cannot 
have a positive relationship with each other; rather 
each term, each sign is constituted as a trace of the 
difference between itself and other signs. In this 
sense a sign does not mark a presence of another sign; 
a sign is a trace of an absence of another sign, of a 
positivity to which it would be related. The meaning 
emerges in the vascilation between and among terms each 
of which becomes a trace of the difference from, an ab-
sence of, and not an identity, similarity with or pre-
sence of other terms. Yet this emergence of meaning 
cannot be given an identity without becoming decon-
structed, deferred, differentiated from itself and 
hence becoming a trace of the difference of other 
meanings. 
An effort to capture a meaning of a term throws one 
toward other terms without permitting either term to 
assume any positive meaning, any identifiable presence; 
all giveness, positivity is erased. This means that 
any metaphysics, whether it assumes our ability to cap-
ture Being, substance, subject or object is forever 
barred. The nostalgia for presence, for identity and 
an identifiable meaning is simply an unrealizable 
nostalgia. The metaphysical nostalgia is more than a 
philosophical quest; it pervades the Western scientific 
efforts to decipher "facts." If metaphysics is decon-
structed, then science must follow suit. 
The diacritical linguistics, stretching from 
DeSaussure through Merleau-Ponty and ending in Derrida, 
conclude the circle and lead back to Husserl's tran-
scendental phenomenology. Despite Derrida's arguments 
to the contrary, the Husserlian "Ur-Ego" as an "event" 
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of differentiation and decomposition of the transcen-
dental ego, is the ground of the hermeneutical concep-
tion of the "difference" and the diacritical conception 
of the deconstruction of metaphysics of "presence." 
This "event" comprises a "movement" which cannot be 
captured either as movement or as permanence, as pre-
sence or as absence; the movement of the difference 
does not point to itself; any pointer, any sign which 
might be established to capture the meaning of the 
difference is a substitution, a sign carrying a trace 
of its being a deviation, a differentiation, but never 
a signification. The differentiating movement is 
forever "different" from anything and from any sign. 
In this sense it cannot be regarded as "significant." 
Rather, it is the "ground" of all failed attempts at 
univocal signification. 
This ground allows us to understand why some of the 
contemporary European thinkers claim that signs do not 
arise in the presence of, or a response to something, 
but precisely in the absence of something. The first 
sign that emerges with the child is not designed to 
signify the presence of the mother who is the satisfier 
of all the needs, but in the absence, in the lack of 
the mother. Sign emerges in the absence of the mother 
and hence any signification from the outset signifies 
not presence but absence, not what is there, but what 
is not there. There is no longer a union with some-
thing, but a differentiation from that something. The 
unity does not require signs, presence cannot be signi-
fied; only the disruption of the unity, the absence of 
the presence requires signs. Yet precisely the absence 
which calls for signs is what constitutes the inevita-
ble difference beween signs and what they signify, what 
constitutes the unavoidable difference between a sign 
and the signified. It is inevitable that the sign will 
not be a representation of something but a differentia-
tion from that something, a trace of the absence of 
something. The barred unity reveals the difference and 
gives birth to signs which attempt to master the other, 
the absent-, the other which is different from all wants 
and desires. Every effort to use signs to signify the 
presense of something, reinforces the difference from 
the something. The unity with something present is 
forever "delayed." 
Since the signs are constituted in the difference 
from and in the absence of the signified, then the 
proliferation of signs cannot be founded on the basis 
of experiences which "give" us something "novel." The 
signs are proliferated, expanded by a diacritical ar-
ticulation and differentiation within signs. With the 
first cry, the first sound manifesting the absence of 
and the difference from the mother, the first oooO-Aaaa 
sound depicted by Freud, the sign is already all 
encompassing. Subsequent developement of other signs 
are not additions, but articulations, differentiations 
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of this one sign. With the first sign everything is 
significant precisely because everything is alien, 
different from the sign, and significant because the 
sign already traced a difference of each other: A-0. 
4. Postscript. 
Whether it is called the transcendental Ur-Ego," 
the "difference" in hermeneutics, the "diacritics" in 
semiotics, the event of the difference cannot be called 
an "eternal" function, a forever present "now," a 
"permanence" or a "flux." Each of these designations 
are possible only by marking a difference from each 
other, by having a meaning which offers no identity no 
presence, but only a difference, an absence. The 
"eternal now" is the trace which is immediately decon-
structed by the "no longer and the not yet; hence any-
thing that could be conceived as present, as given is 
also deconstructed toward the non-given, non-present. 
In this sense the event of the difference is neither 
now, past nor future, it is neither permanence nor 
flux. Here all philosophy, all science, all human 
nostalgia for presence, identity, the given, fail. 
This failure is a failure of metaphysical thought. The 
question remains whether metaphysical thought is the 
sole avenue to understanding? After all, various cul-
tures have not developed metaphysical thought and yet 
were capable of understanding the world. Perhaps it is 
possible to look at the ways of thinking called "my-
thological" which are no less viable than the metaphys-
ical. Of course, the understanding of mythological 
thought would have to be stripped of its derogatory 
designation given to it by the Western metaphysical 
thought. In fact, the metaphysical thought, in its ini-
tial emergence, could be understood only as a trace of 
a difference between itself and the mythical thought. 
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